Technocratic government
Near impossibleMechanism
A government composed of non-partisan experts, appointed to manage the Region's affairs outside the logic of classical coalition politics
Who can trigger this
Consensus among parties represented in the Brussels Parliament to temporarily relinquish executive power
Timeline
A few weeks
Precedent
Italy (Monti 2011, Draghi 2021), never in Belgium (Italy, 2021)
Legal basis
No specific legal basis in Belgium — Brussels regional ministers must be members of Parliament
Risks
- No direct democratic legitimacy — ministers do not carry a partisan electoral mandate
- Foreseeable resistance from political parties, who would lose control of the executive
- No Belgian precedent at any level of government
- Brussels ministers must be parliamentarians — an external expert cannot be appointed directly
- Limited lifespan without a lasting political anchor
The concept
A technocratic government is an executive composed of experts and non-partisan figures, appointed to manage public affairs outside the logic of coalition-building and inter-party negotiation. The idea rests on the principle that independent experts could make more effective and less ideological decisions than ministers drawn from the party apparatus.
This model has been used primarily in Italy, at moments of severe crisis when the party system found itself unable to form a government.
The Italian precedents
The Monti government (2011-2013)
In November 2011, faced with a sovereign debt crisis and pressure from financial markets, the President of the Italian Republic appointed an economist and former European Commissioner to head a government composed exclusively of technocrats. This government carried out structural reforms (pensions, labour market) with the support of a broad parliamentary majority.
Source: Camera dei Deputati — XVI Legislatura, accessed 7 February 2026.
The Draghi government (2021-2022)
In February 2021, faced with the failure of inter-party negotiations and the health crisis, the President of the Republic tasked a former President of the European Central Bank with forming a government of national unity. This government included both technocrats and party ministers, in a hybrid formula.
Source: Governo Italiano — Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, accessed 7 February 2026.
What these examples show
The Italian technocratic governments share several characteristics:
- They emerged in moments of acute crisis (financial, health)
- They were made possible by the active role of the President of the Republic, who in Italy has a power of appointment that the King of the Belgians does not hold at the regional level
- They benefited from temporary cross-party parliamentary support
- They had a limited lifespan — none completed a full legislature
Why this is structurally impossible in Brussels
1. Ministers must be parliamentarians
This is the most fundamental obstacle. The Special Act of 12 January 1989 (Article 34) provides that members of the Brussels government are elected by Parliament from among its members or from among former members. An external expert — a university professor, a senior civil servant, a former business executive — cannot be appointed directly as a Brussels regional minister.
This constraint does not exist in the Italian system, where the President of the Council and ministers do not need to be parliamentarians.
Source: Special Act of 12 January 1989, Article 34, accessed 7 February 2026.
2. No President of the Republic as arbiter
In Italy, the President of the Republic plays a central role in the formation of technocratic governments: taking the initiative, consulting, appointing. In Belgium, at the regional level, there is no equivalent arbitral figure. The King does not intervene in the formation of the Brussels government. The President of the Brussels Parliament does not have this power either.
3. Resistance from parties
A technocratic government assumes that parties accept temporarily relinquishing executive power. In the Belgian system, parties are the central actors in any formation process. No party has an interest in ceding control of ministerial portfolios to external figures — this would mean losing both political influence and the resources associated with ministerial cabinets.
4. The dual linguistic majority
Even if a technocratic government could be constituted, it would need to obtain Parliament's confidence with a majority in both linguistic groups. The appointed experts would need to respect linguistic parity (2 francophone ministers, 2 Dutch-speaking ministers, plus the minister-president). This constraint adds a complexity that does not exist in the Italian model.
Source: Brussels Parliament — Institutional functioning, accessed 7 February 2026.
A possible variant: the "semi-technocratic" government
Some observers raise a more realistic variant: a government composed of parliamentarians chosen for their technical profile rather than for their partisan weight. Parliamentarians with specific expertise (public finance, urban planning, mobility) would be appointed as ministers with a results-oriented mandate.
This variant would respect the constitutional constraint (the ministers would be parliamentarians), but would require a radical shift in political culture — with parties accepting to appoint ministers based on their competences rather than their partisan loyalty.
Legal basis
There is no legal basis for a technocratic government in Belgian law. The formation of the Brussels government is governed by:
- The Special Act of 12 January 1989
- The rules of procedure of the Brussels Parliament
- Established constitutional practices
None of these texts provides for the appointment of ministers from outside Parliament or a formation process led by a non-partisan authority.
In summary
The technocratic government is a model that has worked in Italy under very specific circumstances, thanks to a radically different constitutional framework. In Belgium, and particularly in Brussels, the obstacles are structural rather than circumstantial: the requirement that ministers be parliamentarians, the absence of an institutional arbiter, and the foreseeable resistance of parties make this scenario near-impossible without a prior amendment of the Special Act.
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