Constructive motion of no confidence

The concept

The constructive motion of no confidence is a parliamentary mechanism that allows a government to be toppled on condition that a successor is simultaneously proposed. Unlike a simple motion of no confidence (which merely topples), the constructive motion requires parliamentarians to present a concrete alternative: a candidate for minister-president and a programme.

This mechanism is inspired by the German model (Article 67 of the Basic Law, konstruktives Misstrauensvotum) and was introduced into Belgian law to prevent power crises without a way out.

Legal basis in Brussels

Article 36 of the Special Act of 12 January 1989 on Brussels institutions provides for this mechanism. The text stipulates that the Brussels Parliament may vote a constructive motion of no confidence provided that:

1. It is signed by an absolute majority of the members of each linguistic group
2. It designates a candidate for the position of minister-president
3. A reflection period is observed between the tabling and the vote

Source: Special Act of 12 January 1989 on Brussels Institutions, Article 36, accessed 7 February 2026.

How it would work in theory

Step 1: Building a majority

Parliamentarians from both linguistic groups agree on a candidate for minister-president and a government programme. They draft a formal motion.

Step 2: Tabling the motion

The motion is tabled at the bureau of the Brussels Parliament, signed by an absolute majority in each linguistic group. Parliament sets a date for the vote in compliance with the regulatory period.

Step 3: The vote

Parliament votes on the motion. If adopted, the sitting government is automatically replaced by the candidate designated in the motion, who then forms a new government.

Why this mechanism has never been used in Brussels

Although the mechanism exists in law, it has never been activated at the level of the Brussels-Capital Region. The reasons are multiple:

1. The obstacle of the dual majority

This is the most significant constraint. The motion must gather an absolute majority in both linguistic groups simultaneously:

• Francophone group: 37 votes out of 72 (absolute majority)
• Dutch-speaking group: 9 votes out of 17 (absolute majority)

Assembling these two majorities around the same candidate and the same programme requires a cross-cutting agreement that is precisely what classical coalition negotiations have failed to produce.

Source: Brussels Parliament — Composition and linguistic groups, accessed 7 February 2026.

2. The ambiguity of the caretaker government

The constructive motion of no confidence is designed to topple a government in office. The current government is in caretaker mode — a de facto situation, not a de jure one. The question of the legal admissibility of a motion against a government that is not exercising its full powers is debated among constitutional scholars.

3. The absence of precedent

Even at the federal level, the constructive motion of no confidence (Article 96 of the Constitution) has never been used successfully. The only comparable case is the abortive attempt of 1925, even before the formal introduction of the constructive mechanism.

Source: Crisp — Parliamentary oversight mechanisms in Belgium, accessed 7 February 2026.

The German model: a point of comparison

In Germany, the constructive motion of no confidence has been used successfully twice:

• 1972: attempt against the federal chancellor, narrowly failed
• 1982: successful motion that brought a new chancellor to power, replacing the incumbent

The German system is, however, fundamentally different: there is no dual linguistic majority, the number of parties is more limited, and the political culture is more accepting of this type of mechanism.

Source: Bundestag — Grundgesetz Artikel 67, accessed 7 February 2026.

The conditions for this to work in Brussels

For a constructive motion of no confidence to succeed in the Brussels Parliament, it would require:

1. A prior agreement between francophone and Dutch-speaking parties on a candidate and a programme — precisely what is missing from the classical negotiations
2. A political will to bypass the traditional formation process
3. A legal opinion confirming the admissibility of the motion against a caretaker government
4. A triggering event strong enough to justify the use of a mechanism that has never been activated

In summary

The constructive motion of no confidence is an existing but theoretical legal instrument in Brussels. Its use would presuppose resolving in advance the very problem that is blocking the formation: assembling a dual linguistic majority around a common programme. It is an instrument designed for governmental crises, not for formation crises — which considerably limits its relevance in the current context.